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JUDICIAL CREATION OF AN ECONOMIC REQUIREMENT UNDER
RICO: TIME TO DISMANTLE THE BARRICADE
The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization1 (RICO) statute
continues to assume new roles.2 Observers attribute the statute's versatil-
ity to its long list of triggering offenses.' The scope and variety of these
offenses allow litigants to append RICO counts to complaints asserting a
wide range of other civil causes of action.
Originally, the prospect of receiving treble damages motivated parties
to include RICO counts in their complaints.4 As plaintiffs and their at-
torneys became more sophisticated, however, they also began to bring
civil RICO claims to obtain access to the federal courts for their ancillary
state claims,5 or to harass defendants whose activities or politics they
morally opposed.6 The increased application of RICO has stimulated
I. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, tit. IX, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922, amended
by Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, tit. II, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 302, 98 Stat. 2040
(1970) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1988)).
2. See, eg., Cao, Illegal Traffic in Women: A Civil RICO Proposal, 96 YALE L. 1297, 1307
(1987) (proposing that prostitutes use civil RICO to escape the prostitution enterprise); Gough,
Wrongful Discharge: Can RICO Come to the Rescue?, 61 FLA. B.J. 91 (1987) (advocating use of civil
RICO to circumvent the Florida employment-at-will doctrine); Juster & Nathan, Law Enforcement
Against International Terrorists: Use of the RICO Statute, 60 U. COLO. L. REv. 553 (1989) (recom-
mending use of civil RICO for combatting terrorism). But cf Abrams, A New Proposal for Limiting
Private Civil RICO, 37 UCLA L. REV. 1, 4 (1989) (offering a method for ensuring that all civil
RICO claims would warrant criminal prosecution); Dorigan & Edwall, Jr., A Proposed RICO Pat-
tern Requirement for the Habitual Commercial Offender, 15 WM. MrrCHELL L. REV. 35, 39 (1989)
(proposing an interpretation of pattern that limits RICO to habitual offenders); Morgan, Civil RICO:
The Legal Galaxy's Black Hole, 22 AKRON L. RaV. 107 (1988) (the Department of Justice and the
Judicial Conference of the United States do not favor creative use of RICO).
3. See Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex, Co., 473 U.S. 479, 500 (1985) (attributing the expansive use
of RICO to the extensive list of predicate offenses).
4. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1988). See Halleland, Adventures in Racketeering, 45 BENCH & B.
MiNN., March 1988 at 14 (discovery of RICO's treble damage provision triggered its broader use).
5. In Northeast Women's Center, Inc. v. McMonagle, 868 F.2d 1342, 1345 (3d Cir.), cert
denied, 110 S. Ct. 261 (1989), an abortion clinic sued anti-abortion demonstrators. The clinic suf-
fered only $887 in damages because of the defendants' RICO violation. Id. at 1347. The clinic
reaped its big financial recovery from a state law trespass claim. Id Thus, the RICO claim served
primarily to allow the clinic to bring its state claims in the federal court. See also Blakey & Perry,
An Analysis of the Myths That Bolster Efforts to Rewrite RICO and the Various Proposals for Reform:
"Mother of God-Is This the End of RICO?," 43 VAND. L. REV. 851, 871-72 (1990) (in 1986, RICO
provided the sole basis for federal subject matter jurisdiction in 37.6 percent of the reported RICO
decisions); Rasmussen, Introductory Remarks and a Comment on Civil RICO'S Remedial Provisions,
43 VAND. L. REv. 623, 629 (1990) (some plaintiffs bring a RICO suit for access to the federal
courts).
6. The abortion demonstration cases illustrate the use of RICO against individuals with a
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debate over whether its use should be limited to defendants whose activi-
ties involve an economic goal.
This Note argues against an economic goal requirement for actions
under RICO. Part I reviews the statute and its pertinent legislative his-
tory. Part II presents the principal cases addressing the issue whether
RICO requires defendants to have an economic motive. Finally, Part III
concludes by opposing the theory that RICO requires defendants to have
an underlying economic incentive.
I. RICO
A. Legislative History
For two decades Congress studied various means of controlling organ-
ized crime.7 In 1970, this effort culminated in the enactment of RICO, a
statute whose criminal and civil provisions8 are designed to eradicate or-
ganized crime,9 halt its detrimental effect on the economy and protect
different moral agenda. These cases involve a clinic targeted by demonstrations or an association
such as the National Organization for Women (NOW) filing a RICO suit against the demonstrators.
See eg., Northeast Women's Center, Inc. v. McMonagle, 868 F.2d 1342 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 110
S. Ct. 261 (1989). See also Scheidler v. National Org. for Women, Inc., 739 F. Supp. 1210 (N.D. I11.
1990) (anti-abortion demonstrators, defendants in a pending case, filed defamation claim against
NOW, in part for publicly announcing that NOW added a RICO count to its claims against the
defendants); Town of West Hartford v. Operation Rescue, 726 F. Supp. 371 (D. Conn. 1989) (town's
RICO claim premised in part on the additional expense incurred in enforcing the law as a result of
the demonstrations); Roe v. Operation Rescue, 710 F. Supp. 577 (E.D. Pa. 1989) (withholding deci-
sion on plaintiff's summary judgment request pending the McMonagle decision). See also Penthouse
Int'l, Ltd. v. American Family Ass'n of Fla., Inc., No. 89-2526 (D. Fla. filed Nov. 14, 1989) (alleging
that defendant violated RICO when it threatened to label certain magazines as obscene); Walden
Book Co. v. American Family Ass'n of Fla., Inc., No. 89-2426 (D. Fla. filed Oct. 31, 1989) (same).
7. United States v. Ivic, 700 F.2d 51, 62 (2d Cir. 1983) (noting various possible approaches).
8. The criminal portion of RICO appears at 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a) (1988). That section pro-
vides in pertinent part that "[w]hoever violates any provision of section 1962 of this chapter shall be
fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years (or for life if the violation is based on a
racketeering activity for which the maximum penalty includes life imprisonment), or both." 18
U.S.C. § 1963(a) (1988).
RICO grants a civil cause of action at 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c). That section provides in pertinent part
that "[a]ny person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of section 1962 of this
chapter may sue therefore in any appropriate United States district court." 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c)
(1988).
9. Congress enacted RICO on Oct. 15, 1970 as title IX of the Organized Crime Control Act of
1970, Pub. L. 91-452. Congress designed the eleven titles of the Organized Crime Control Act of
1970 to accomplish several purposes. These purposes included providing stronger evidence gather-
ing tools, enhanced sanctions, new remedies, and new penal prohibitions in the fight against organ-
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businesses from the stifling impact of organized crime.10
Although Congress focused on organized crime, it encouraged liberal
use of the statute.'" A principal sponsor of RICO hoped that "experts on
organized crime [would] conceive of additional applications of the
law."12 Thus, over the objections of members opposed to RICO's poten-
tial for use far beyond organized crime, 13 Congress passed a broadly
worded statute capable of wide-ranging applications.
ized crime. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS (84 Stat. 922) 1073.
Despite congressional proposals to modify the statute, RICO has undergone little change in its
twenty year existence. In 1984, Congress changed the forfeiture provisions and added an obscenity
predicate act. The changes RICO has experienced have broadened its scope. The list of predicate
offenses has grown through the years to include trafficking in contraband cigarettes (added in 1978),
dealing in obscene matter (added in 1984), and sexually exploiting children (added in 1988), to name
a few. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (1988).
Recent congressional proposals attempted to remove ambiguity and limit the scope of RICO. In
the 99th Congress, Senator Metzenbaum (R-Ohio) and Representative Boucher (D-Virginia) intro-
duced a bill to modify RICO. Their bill would have eliminated treble damage awards against de-
fendants without a prior criminal conviction and for civil claims based on commercial fraud. In
addition, the bill would have shortened the maximum period between racketeering acts from ten to
five years and replaced the phrase "racketeering activity" with "illicit activity." Although the bill
passed in the House, the Senate defeated it by three votes. Senator Metzenbaum and Representative
Boucher again introduced RICO reform bills in the 100th Congress. Both bills resembled the previ-
ous proposal. Both, however, awarded an attorney's fee to the defendant if the plaintiff's claim was
unreasonable. Boucher's bill would also raise the level of proof for a plaintiff seeking treble damages
from the usual "preponderance of evidence" standard used in civil cases to "clear and convincing
evidence." Jones, Civil RICO and the General Practitioner, 5 COMPLEAT LAW., Winter 1988 at 37.
10. Threats of violence to persons or property deprive individuals and businesses of the freedom
to choose how and where to spend their money, the essence of the American economy. S. REP. No.
617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 76-77 (1969). See also 115 CONG. REc. 5874 (1969) (remarks of Senator
Hruska). Those who succumb to organized crime's coercive threats pass money untaxed into the
criminal arena for later use in corrupting new and different individuals and businesses. S. REP. No.
617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 76 (1969). Congress designed RICO to stop this self-perpetuating cycle by
striking out at the economic base of the process and eliminating the unfair competitive advantage
accruing to organizations obtaining money through illegal methods. Id. at 79; see also 115 CONG.
REc. 827 (1969) (remarks of Senator McClellan, the principal sponsor of RICO); Organized Crime
Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (84 Stat. 922)
1073; S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 76, 81 (1969) (quoting Report of Antitrust Section of the
ABA on S.2043 and S.2049) ("crime takes billions of dollars . .. annually from the American
public").
11. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 904(a), 84 Stat. 922, 947.
12. 115 CONG. REc. 6993 (1969) (statement of Sen. Hruska, a principal sponsor of RICO). For
a discussion of Senator Hruska's role in the legislative process, see Blakey, The RICO Civil Fraud
Action in Context Reflections on Bennett v. Berg, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 237, 253-56, 258-65
(1988).
13. Senators Philip A. Hart and Edward M. Kennedy expressed their concerns regarding the
potential abuse of RICO. S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 215 (1969).
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B. Statutory Provisions
To further its goal, Congress developed an arsenal of weapons and in-
centives for the civil and criminal organized crime fighter. Provisions
allowing forfeiture of profits14 and stronger evidence gathering tools15
strengthen criminal RICO, while treble damages, 6 attorneys fees17 and
access to the federal courts 8 are a few incentives19 for the civil RICO
plaintiff.
Congress based both civil and criminal liability on performance of at
least one of three substantive prohibited activities.20 Section 1962(a)
classifies money laundering as a prohibited activity.2" This section pros-
14. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a)(1) (1988). Section 1963 permits courts to seize any interest a criminal
defendant acquired in violation of RICO. Section 1963(a) provides:
Whoever violates any provision of section 1962 of this chapter shall be fined under this title
or imprisoned not more than 20 years (or for life if the violation is based on a racketeering
activity for which the maximum penalty includes life imprisonment), or both.[sc], and
shall forfeit to the United States (1) any interest the person has acquired or maintained in
violation of section 1962; (2) any - (A) interest in; (B) security of, (C) claim against; or
(D) property or contractual right of any kind affording a source of influence over; any
enterprise which the person has established, operated, controlled, conducted, or partici-
pated in the conduct of, in violation of section 1962; and (3) any property constituting, or
derived from, any proceeds which the person obtained, directly or indirectly, from racke-
teering activity or unlawful debt collection in violation of section 1962.
18 U.S.C. § 1963(a) (1988).
15. Prior to bringing a criminal RICO proceeding, the Attorney General can demand evidence
relevant to a racketeering investigation. 18 U.S.C. § 1968 (1988). This provision also applies to
pending civil RICO claims.
16. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1988).
17. Id.
18. Id. Section 1964(c) permits "any person injured in his business or property" by a RICO
violation to bring suit in federal district court. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1988).
19. Other incentives include expedited trial dates and broad venue and process rules. 18 U.S.C.
§§ 1965(a)(5), 1966 (1988).
20. Congress provided for criminal prosecution at 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a) (1988) and for a civil
cause of action at 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1988). Each of these sections requires a violation by the
RICO defendant of one of the prohibited activities in 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1988).
21. Section 1962(a) makes it:
[U]nlawful for any person who has received any income derived, directly or indirectly,
from a pattern of racketeering activity or through collection of an unlawful debt in which
such person has participated as a principal within the meaning of section 2, title 18, United
States Code, to use or invest, directly or indirectly, any part of such income, or the pro-
ceeds of such income, in acquisition of any interest in, or the establishment or operation of,
any enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign
commerce.
18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (1988).
The focus of § 1962(a) is the destination of money obtained through the pattern of racketeering.
After acquiring money through illegal means, organized crime typically "launders" the money by
investing it in a separate business. Section 1962(a) makes the process of laundering the funds illegal.
Halleland, Adventures in Racketeering, BENCH & B. MINN., March 1988 at 14, 16.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol68/iss4/8
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cribes investing money derived from a pattern of racketeering activity in
an enterprise affecting interstate commerce.22 Section 1962(b) proscribes
controlling an enterprise affecting interstate commerce through a pattern
of racketeering activity.23 Sometimes characterized as the "muscle" por-
tion of RICO, it criminalizes takeovers of unions and businesses through
extortion tactics.24 Lastly, section 1962(c) forbids the operation of an
enterprise affecting interstate commerce through a pattern of
racketeering.
25
All three substantive sections require proof of an enterprise and a pat-
tern of racketeering activity.26 Section 1961(4) defines27 an "enterprise"
as "includ[ing] any individual, partnership, corporation, association or
other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in
fact although not a legal entity. '28  "Including" is the pivotal word in
this definition. Congress described only a subset of the organizations
comprising the entire class of enterprises, thus leaving the ultimate char-
acterization of an "enterprise" to the courts.29
22. See supra note 21.
23. Section 1962(b) makes it "unlawful for any person through a pattern of racketeering activ-
ity or through collection of any unlawful debt to acquire or maintain, directly or indirectly, any
interest in or control of any enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate
or foreign commerce." 18 U.S.C. § 1962(b) (1988).
24. See Halleland, Adventures in Racketeering, BENcH & B. MINN., March 1988 at 14, 16 (a
§ 1962(b) violation, for example, "might involve repeated extortionary activities leading to the take-
over of a local union"). Halleland perceived § 1962(b) as the least used section of RICO. Id.
25. Section 1962(c) makes it "unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any
enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or
participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of
racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt." 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1988).
RICO provides a fourth prohibited act. Section 1962(d) proscribes conspiring to violate
§ 1962(a), (b) or (c). 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) (1988). It is unnecessary to address this section separately
because it criminalizes agreeement to perform the conduct specified in § 1962(a), (b) and (c). Thus,
any conclusion regarding the existence of an economic requirement in § 1962(a), (b) or (c) applies to
§ 1962(d) without more analysis. See United States v. Ivic, 700 F.2d 51, 59-65 (2d Cir. 1983) (ana-
lyzing economic requirement for § 1962(d) conspiracy to violate § 1962(c) by scrutinizing require-
ments of § 1962(c)).
26. See supra notes 21-25 and accompanying text.
27. RICO defines ten terms. Apart from the three terms discussed in this Note, § 1961 also
defines "State," .person," "unlawful debt," "racketeering investigator," "racketeering investiga-
tion," "documentary material" and "Attorney General." See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(2), (3), (6)-(10)
(1988).
28. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (1988).
29. See United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 580, 593 (1981) (describing the enterprise
definition as broad and free of restrictions). For examples of the organizations plaintiffs assert as
enterprises, see H.J, Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 109 S. Ct. 2893, 2897 (1989) (telephone
company and utilities commission); United States v. Indelicato, 865 F.2d 1370, 1371 (2d Cir.) (or-
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Congress drafted the "pattern" definition employing a similar tech-
nique. Section 1961 describes a pattern as "requir[ing] at least two acts
of racketeering activity" within ten years.3" The description does not
specify the level of activity required to form a pattern.31 Instead, it
merely establishes a lower limit of two acts, leaving it to the courts to
identify the level of activity necessary to constitute a pattern.32
Though unclear as to the level of activity needed to constitute a "pat-
tern," Congress developed a specific list of crimes comprising "racketeer-
ing" activity. Often called predicate acts,33 this list includes both state
crimes34 and federal offenses as unusual as trafficking in contraband ciga-
ganized crime family), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 56 (1989); Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n v.
Touche Ross & Co., 782 F.2d 966, 970 (11th Cir. 1986) (corporation); Feminist Women's Health
Center v. Roberts, No. C86-161(V)D, slip op. at 10-11 (W.D. Wash. March 11, 1988) (informally
associated group of anti-abortion demonstrators); Hunt v. Weatherbee, 626 F. Supp. 1097, 1102 (D.
Mass. 1986) (union local).
30. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1988).
31. H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 109 S. Ct. 2893, 2899 (1989). The definition of
other terms buttresses this point. The statute defines "pattern" using the word "requires," while it
defines "racketeering activity," "State," "unlawful debt," "racketeering investigator" and "racke-
teering investigation" by using the more definitive word "means." Compare 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5)
(1988) and 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1), (2), (6), (7), (8) (1988).
32. H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 109 S. Ct. 2893, 2899 (1989) (quoting Sedima,
S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 496 n.14 (1985)). But see Hunt v. Weatherbee, 626 F. Supp.
1097, 1100 (D. Mass. 1986) (claim alleging two predicate acts survived motion to dismiss).
33. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (1988). See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
34. State offenses include "murder, kidnapping, gambling, arson, robbery, bribery, extortion,
dealing in obscene matter, or dealing in narcotic or other dangerous drugs" so long as the acts are
"chargeable under State law and punishable for more than one year." 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (1988).
RICO litigation focuses on both the "chargeable under State law" and the "punishable for more than
one year" requirements. For the former requirement, courts must determine when the acts are
chargeable under state law: when committed or when the RICO claim is filed? In United States v.
Davis, 576 F.2d 1065, 1067 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 836 (1978), the Third Circuit concluded
that the "chargeable" requirement refers to "chargeable under State law at the time the offense was
committed." In Davis, at the time the RICO claim was filed, the statute of limitations would have
barred two of the five acts under state law. The court concluded, however, that all five acts were
chargeable under state law at the time they were committed and therefore the RICO claim could
stand. Id. The strength of the court's assertion is weakened, however, by the court's reliance on the
fact that three acts, a sufficient number to sustain a RICO claim, were not barred, even in the state
courts, by the statute of limitations. Id.
Although the Davis court announced a simple rule for determining if an alleged act was "charge-
able under State law," an exception clearly arises when a state's right to charge an individual is
terminated by state prosecution. Courts reach varying conclusions on the effect a state court acquit-
tal has on a RICO claim which relies on the acts underlying the state court claim. Compare United
States v. Louie, 625 F. Supp. 1327, 1335-37 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (acquittal extinguishes state claim and
therefore no longer "chargeable" within the meaning of criminal RICO) with Von Bulow ex rel.
Auersperg v. Von Bulow, 634 F. Supp. 1284, 1309-10 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (civil RICO claim stands
despite prior acquittal in state court) and with United States v. Frumento, 563 F.2d 1083, 1088-89
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rettes35 and white slaves.3 6 However, the more mundane predicate acts
of securities,37 mail,38 and wire fraud39 form the basis of most RICO
claims.40
Because organized crime's economic domination of legitimate busi-
nesses was a primary impetus for enacting the statute,4' Congress incor-
porated hefty financial penalties into RICO. For civil RICO violations, a
successful plaintiff can recover treble damages.42 Moreover, criminal
RICO defendants are subject to the standard fines for federal crimes' 3
and imprisonment for up to twenty years or for life, if the maximum
penalty for the underlying racketeering activity includes life imprison-
ment.' In both civil and criminal RICO cases, the statute also grants
the courts extensive power to excise illegal income from defendants, thus
returning it to the free economy and preventing future similar occur-
rences.45 For example, courts can fashion civil remedies such as divest-
(3d Cir. 1977) (criminal RICO conviction stands despite prior acquittal in state court), cert. denied
sub nom. Millhouse v. United States, 434 U.S. 1072 (1978).
The "punishable for more than one year" requirement also gives the courts pause. A state may
have several penal statutes addressing various forms of bribery. Some of those statutes may allow
punishment for more than one year and some may not. If the alleged RICO predicate acts are state
law bribery, are the acts punishable for more than one year? The court in United States v. Forsythe,
560 F.2d 1127 (3d Cir. 1977), addressed this exact issue. Citing the legislative history, the court
claimed that "state offenses are included by generic designation." Id. at 1137 (citations omitted).
Thus, the court concluded that although the state bribery statute did not allow for punishment for
more than one year, other similar state statutes covering corrupt solicitation did allow punishment
for more than one year. Id. at 1138. The alleged acts of bribery could form RICO predicate acts. Id.
35. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2341-2346 (1988).
36. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2421-2424 (1988).
37. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(D) (1988) (any "fraud connected with a case under title 11, fraud in
the sale of securities").
38. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1988).
39. 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (1988).
40. REPORT OF THE AD Hoc CTVIL Rico TASK FORCE 417, 457 (1985) (seventy-nine percent
of the pre-1985 cases involved mail, wire or securities fraud.)
41. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
42. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1988).
43. A federal statute authorizes fines in excess of the amount specified in federal criminal stat-
utes. 18 U.S.C. § 3571 (1988). The statute imposes a maximum fine calculated by the nature of the
offense and the status of the defendant. Thus, because RICO convictions are class B felonies, indi-
vidual defendants are generally subject to a maximum fine of $250,000 and corporate defendants to a
maximum fine of $500,000. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3559, 3571(b)(3) & (c)(3) (1988). These general maxi-
mums can be exceeded, however, when the defendant prospers or another party suffers a loss as a
result of the offense. In that event, "the defendant may be fined... the greater of twice the gross
gain or twice the gross loss." 18 U.S.C. § 3571(d) (1988).
44. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a) (1988).
45. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
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ment or restrictions on future activities. 6 In criminal cases, courts can
order forfeiture of profits or other property interests obtained through
activities in violation of RICO.4 7
II. JUDICIAL CONSIDERATION OF THE ECONOMIC GOAL
REQUIREMENT 4
8
The issue of whether to impose an economic goal requirement arises in
both criminal and civil cases.4 9 Though the type of proceeding in which
the issue arises may provide insight into the court's approach, it ulti-
mately does not alter the decision's relevance to future civil and criminal
RICO cases.5" Both criminal and civil RICO claims are based on the
same section 1962 substantive offenses,51 thus any interpretation of sec-
tion 1962 or its terms applies equally to both.
A. Economic Goal Required for Enterprise or Predicate Acts
The Second Circuit first identified a financial requirement for RICO
violations in United States v. Ivic.52 In Ivic, the defendants were Croatian
nationalists accused of attempting several acts of terrorism designed to
further the cause of Croatian independence.53 A jury convicted the na-
46. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(a) (1988).
47. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a), (c) (1988).
48. Congress fashioned RICO after the equally ambiguous Sherman Act. See Blakey, The
RICO Civil Fraud Action in Context: Reflections on Bennett v. Berg, 58 NoTRE DAME L. REV. 237,
253-56, 262-63 (1982). In enacting the Sherman Act Congress contemplated extensive judicial
interpretation of the ban on combinations and conspiracies in restraint of trade. See P. AREIDA &
L. KAPLOW, ANTrrRusT ANALYSIS 50 (1988). RICO practitioners, as well, must rely to a greater
degree than most statutes on judicial interpretation. Such interpretation plays a critical role in
RICO claims as courts struggle to reconcile congressional intent to strike out at organized crime
with the broad statutory language in RICO. For example, in United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576
(1981), the Court resolved the controversy over the scope of the term "enterprise" by holding that
contrary to the decisions of some lower courts, an enterprise is not limited to criminal associations.
In HJ. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 109 S. Ct. 2893 (1989), the Supreme Court focused on
RICO's "pattern" requirement, refusing to hold that a pattern requires more than two acts or more
than one scheme.
49. For criminal cases, see infra notes 52, 72, 84, 86 and accompanying text. For civil cases, see
infra notes 93, 103 and accompanying text.
50. See Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808, 812 (1971) (courts should resolve ambiguities in
criminal statutes "in favor of lenity").
51. See supra notes 20, 21, 23, 25.
52. 700 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1983). Oddly enough, the defendants did not raise this defense. The
court of appeals suggested the issue at oral argument and requested written briefs on the issue. Id. at
59 n.5.
53. The defendants failed in their attempt to plant a bomb at the site of a Yugoslavian Indepen-
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tionalists of conspiring to violate section 1962(c). 54 The trial court found
that the defendants' plot to murder certain political enemies 5 comprised
the required racketeering acts,56 and the Croatian nationalists formed the
alleged enterprise.57 However, the Second Circuit reversed, concluding
that because neither the enterprise nor the racketeering acts had a finan-
cial purpose, the defendants did not violate RICO.58
In holding that a RICO violation occurs only if the acts or the enter-
prise have a financial motive, the Second Circuit first reviewed the lan-
guage of the statute. The court noted that sections 1962(a), (b) and (c)
all refer to an "enterprise."59 The court found that the language of sec-
tions 1962(a) and (b), referring to individuals investing in or acquiring a
property interest in an enterprise, implies that an enterprise is a "profit-
seeking venture."' Because section 1962(c) also uses the term "enter-
prise," the court concluded that a section 1962(c) enterprise must like-
wise be a "profit-seeking venture. 61
dence Day Party in New York City because "there was no place to park." Id. at 54-55. After the
defendants observed a Croatian journalist and politician for three days, the FBI warned the journal-
ist and stymied their assassination plot. Id. at 53-54. The defendants abandoned another bomb
scheme when they discovered surveillance wires in their home. Id at 55.
54. Id. at 52-53.
55. Id. at 59. The defendants favored attaining Croatian independence through violence, while
their targets, although equally favoring independence, vocally opposed violence. Id. at 53-54.
56. Id. at 58-59.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 59.
59. Id. at 60. See supra notes 21, 23, 25.
60. Ivic, 700 F.2d at 60. Because it prohibits investment of income, § 1962(a) clearly evidences
an economic requirement. Similarly, the language of § 1962(b), referring to acquiring an interest in
an enterprise, evinces an economic requirement. Thus, the economic requirement issue has only
arisen in cases alleging a violation of § 1962(c) or a § 1962(d) conspiracy to violate § 1962(c). See
Northeast Women's Center, Inc. v. McMonagle, 868 F.2d 1342, 1348 (3d Cir.) (§ 1962(c)), cert.
denied, 110 S. Ct. 261 (1989); Feminist Women's Health Center v. Roberts, No. C86-161(v)D
(W.D. Wash. Mar. 11, 1988) (WESTLAW, 1988 WL 156656) (§ 1962(c) and (d)); United States v.
Flynn, 852 F.2d 1045, 1046 (8th Cir.) (same), cert denied, 109 S. Ct. 511 (1988); United States v.
Bagaric, 706 F.2d 42, 52 (2d Cir. 1983) (same); United States v. Ivic, 700 F.2d 51, 54 (2d Cir. 1983)
(§ 1962(d)); United States v. Anderson, 626 F.2d 1358, 1360 (8th Cir. 1980) (same), cert denied, 450
U.S. 912 (1981).
61. Ivic, 700 F.2d at 60. The First Circuit accepted a similar line of argument in United States
v. Turkette, 632 F.2d 896 (1st Cir.), rev'd, 452 U.S. 576 (1981). In Turkette the court addressed
whether RICO extends to illegitimate enterprises and it observed that § 1962(a) and (b) apply only
to legitimate enterprises. Id. at 898-99. With that understanding, the First Circuit concluded that
§ 1962(c) contains the same limitation. Id. at 899. The Supreme Court, however, concluded that
the First Circuit erred in initially limiting § 1962(a) and (b) to legitimate enterprises. United States
v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 584 (1981). The Court held instead that all three substantive provisions
extend to illegitimate organizations. Id. at 585.
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The title of the act further supported the Second Circuit's conclusion
that RICO includes an economic requirement.62 The court found an in-
tent to limit the statute's focus to "money-making activities" by turning
to the dictionary's definition of "racketeer, ' 6 "one who extorts money,"
and to its understanding of the ordinary use of "corrupt."' 6  In addition,
the court analyzed the statement of findings in the legislative history.65
In the statement of findings, Congress claimed organized crime siphons
billions of dollars out of the American economy and identified economi-
cally oriented crimes which make this drain possible.6 The court stated
that these findings, combined with the history of RICO and its precur-
sors, evidence congressional concern for the illicit income derived from
organized crime.67
Finally, the Ivic court turned briefly to the question of whether a
RICO defendant may satisfy the economic requirement by committing
financially motivated predicate acts. The court relied primarily on state-
ments made by Senator McClellan, the principal sponsor of the Organ-
ized Crime Control Act. 68  On several occasions, Senator McClellan
stated that the pattern of violations or crimes must lead to "obtain[ing]
or operat[ing] an interest in an interstate business" in order to fall under
RICO.69 Based on Senator McClellan's statements, the court concluded
that either the enterprise or the predicate acts must have an economic
62. Ivic, 700 F.2d at 61. The court recognized that the title did not control over the words of
the statute, but viewed it as providing insight into legislative intent. Id.
63. Id. (citing WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1963)).
64. Id. Because the defendants were freedom fighters who did not desire personal gain, the
court concluded that "misguided" and not "corrupt" more appropriately described the defendants.
Id.
65. Id. at 61-62.
66. The Statement of Findings provides:
The Congress finds that (1) organized crime in the United States is a highly sophisticated,
diversified, and widespread activity that annually drains billions of dollars from America's
economy by unlawful conduct and the illegal use of force, fraud, and corruption; (2) organ-
ized crime derives a major portion of its power through money obtained from such illegal
endeavors as syndicated gambling, loan sharking, the theft and fencing of property, the
importation and distribution of narcotics and other dangerous drugs, and other forms of
social exploitation.
Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS (84 Stat. 922) 1073.
67. Ivic, 700 F.2d at 62-63. Legislative proposals preceding RICO focused on money derived
from illegal activities. The court admitted RICO "went somewhat beyond this initial conception."
Id. at 63.
68. Id. at 63-64.
69. Id. at 64 (quoting 116 CONG. REc. 18,940 (1970)).
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goal.1 °
In a footnote, the Second Circuit deferred judgment on the application
of RICO to individuals who extort money to further political activities.71
Within a few months of the Ivic decision, however, the Second Circuit
decided that issue in United States v. Bagaric.72 Bagaric again involved
Croatian nationalists.73 This time, the defendants sent extortion letters
requesting financial support for the independence movement.74 They at-
tempted to assassinate any recipient who did not comply with the re-
quest.75  Because the racketeering acts had a financial as well as a
political motive, the Second Circuit upheld the RICO conviction.76 The
court found it inappropriate to inquire into the defendant's subjective
intent.77 Instead, it explained that the financial goal requirement is satis-
fied if there exists an objectively visible economic goal.78
Bagaric's reasoning clarifies the holding and the logic of the Ivic deci-
70. Ivic, 700 F.2d at 64.
71. Id. at 61 n.6.
72. 706 F.2d 42 (2d Cir.), cert denied sub nom. Logarusic v. United States, 464 U.S. 840
(1983).
73. Id at 46. The court convicted a group of Croatian nationalists led by Ante Ljubas of a
series of violent crimes and extortion schemes committed in the name of Croatian nationalism. Ini-
tially, two Chicago mobsters hired by Ljubas attempted to murder a Pittsburgh businessman whom
Ljubas felt was pro-Yugoslavian. Id. at 47. Subsequently, Ljubas recruited other Croatians to join
him in his cause. Id. In the year that followed, terrorist activities for the "Croatian cause" esca-
lated. The New York City Bomb Squad found and dismantled bombs in the United Nations library
and in a locker at Grand Central Station. Id. at 49. Several terrorists set fire to the Yugoslavian
American Club in California. They also attempted to assassinate the Yugoslavian consul in San
Francisco. Id. at 49. In mid-1977, Croatian terrorists developed an extortion scheme at a meeting in
West Germany. Id. at 48. The terrorists escalated their use of activities such as arms trafficking,
arson, and bombings to support the extortion scheme as well as to threaten pro-Yugoslavian fac-
tions. Id. at 49-51. A few terrorists travelled to Europe to share their bomb construction knowledge
with their European counterparts. Id. at 51. The appellants were arrested and brought to trial in
early 1982. Id. at 51-52.
74. In mid-1977, Ljubas travelled to West Germany, where he and others committed to Croa-
tian nationalism devised a scheme to extort money from "moderate" Croatians. Id. at 48. Under
this scheme, Croatian terrorists sent letters to wealthy Croatians in the United States demanding
financial support for their terrorist activities. Id. at 48. These letters usually requested between
$5,000 and $20,000 and threatened violent reprisal for refusal to contribute. Id. at 49.
75. A few months after mailing the letters, the terrorists carried out violent attacks on several
recipients. Id. at 49-50. The terrorists shot and killed one man outside his home and threw pipe
bombs into the homes of others. Id. at 50. Two "book bombs" sent by the defendants through the
mail were dismantled without incident. Id. at 51.
76. Id at 58. The core of the enterprise "was the commission of more than fifty acts of the
classic economic crime of extortion." Id
77. Id. at 53-54.
78. Id at 55. The court feared that requiring more would politicize the trial. Id. In addition,
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sion.79 The'defendants in Bagaric alleged that their activities did not
meet the Ivic test because their enterprise lacked an economic purpose. 80
In rejecting this argument, the court explained that the "nature of the
misconduct often provides the best clue toward defining the enter-
prise.""1 The court asserted that an organization's acts, as well as the
nature of the enterprise, provide clues to the organization's true inten-
tions.8 2 Thus, the economic nature of the predicate acts in Bagaric satis-
fied the Second Circuit's requirement that an economic goal in the
enterprise'or its acts is a prerequisite to a RICO violation.83
B. Economic Goal Required for Enterprise Only
Like the Second Circuit, the Eighth Circuit requires a financial goal as
a prerequisite to a RICO violation. The Eighth Circuit, however, re-
quires proof that the enterprise has a financial motive, independent of the
nature of the predicate acts. 4 The financial orientation of the predicate
the court recognized that inquiry into motive is unorthodox and rare. Congress requests inquiry into
motive only when the acts are blameless absent an improper motive. Id. at 53.
The court recognized that nonprofit organizations are enterprises. Id. at 56. However, by defini-
tion, nonprofit organizations do not operate primarily to make money. An enterprise may have
Croatian freedom as its primary goal. If the organization has a subordinate interest in obtaining
money, however, the economic requirement is met. Id. at 58.
79. Id. at 53-58.
80. Id. at 53.
81. Id. at 55.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. In United States v. Anderson, 626 F.2d 1358, 1372 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S.
912 (1981), the Eighth Circuit held that an enterprise must have a financial goal apart from the
racketeering activities. There, two judges performed administrative functions, including purchasing,
in addition to their judicial responsibilities. Id. at 1361. In performing these administrative duties
they became involved in a scheme whereby an independent businessman falsified purchase vouchers
to reflect an inflated price, and then shared the overcharge with the judges. Id.
The case turned on the court's holding that the tests for a pattern of racketeering and an enterprise
do not coalesce in a § 1962(c) violation. Id. at 1362-72. Because the government alleged that the
two judges and the businessman constituted a RICO enterprise, the court held that the enterprise did
not exist separate from the pattern of racketeering activity and reversed the judges' convictions. Id.
at 1361-62. See also United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 582-83 (1981) (enterprise and pattern
elements in, a RICO claim are separate and distinct, although in certain cases they may coalesce).
Because the court relied on the lack of separateness between the enterprise and the racketeering
activity, it did not address the economic nature of the enterprise. However, it stated that the enter-
prise must not only exist independent of the pattern, but it must have a discrete economic existence.
Anderson, 626 F.2d at 1372 (a violation requires "a discrete economic association existing separately
from the racketeering activity"). In so construing the statute, the court focused on the economic
orientation of many of the predicate acts and Congress' concern for protecting the free market econ-
omy. Id. at 1368. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
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offenses and congressional concern for protecting the free market econ-
omy lead the Eighth Circuit to this result."5
In United States v. Flynn,86 a case involving a struggle for control of a
union in St. Louis, Missouri, 7 the complaint charged the defendant with
three predicate offenses involving murder and conspiracy to murder.88
The defendant did not receive any money for these acts.89 The court
held, however, that the interest in gaining control of the union consti-
tuted an economic goal distinct from the predicate offenses. 90 The de-
fendant's enterprise thus satisfied the Eighth Circuit's economic
requirement.91 The Eighth Circuit sustained the RICO convictions. 92
85. Anderson, 626 F.2d at 1368.
86. 852 F.2d 1045 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 511 (1988).
87. Id. at 1047. The squabble centered around control of Local 42 of the Laborers' Interna-
tional Union in St. Louis. An Italian faction controlled one of St. Louis' three laborers' locals. A
faction headed by Paul Leisure was gaining control of another. The Leisure faction feared that if the
Italian faction dominated the third local, Local 42, it would jeopardize Leisure's existing power. Id.
88. Id. at 1050. The defendant, Flynn, was the business manager of Local 42. Id. at 1047. A
member of the Leisure crime faction recruited Flynn to participate in its scheme. Id.
89. Id. In all likelihood, Flynn acted out of fear for his life. Spica, a member of the Italian
faction, told Leisure that the Italians planned to kill Flynn. Leisure viewed this as an opportunity to
gain Flynn's support and told Flynn of the plan. After that, Flynn became actively involved in
furthering the Leisure organization's interests. Id.
90. Id. at 1052. The court stated that "[flor purposes of RICO, an enterprise must be directed
toward an economic goal." Id.
91. Id. (citing United States v. Anderson, 626 F.2d 1358, 1372 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450
U.S. 912 (1981)).
92. Id. The predicate acts in Flynn, however, did not have an economic orientation independ-
ent of achieving the enterprise's economic goal. See supra note 84 and accompanying text. Thus, it
is arguable that the Flynn decision did not resolve the question whether the Eighth Circuit would
allow a RICO claim against an enterprise without an economic goal if the predicate acts did have an
economic orientation.
Two arguments can be made against this claim. First, the court unequivocally stated that a RICO
"enterprise must be directed toward an economic goal." Flynn, 852 F.2d at 1052. However, follow-
ing this quote and a cite to Anderson, the court also directed attention to United States v. Ivic, 700
F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1983), in which the Second Circuit held that economically motivated predicate acts
will satisfy RICO's economic requirement. 852 F.2d at 1052. The court may have considered the
Ivic standard equivalent to the Anderson standard or it may have thought the Ivic standard, although
not equivalent, still supported its position. The latter perspective has greater merit because the
court, clearly aware of the Ivic decision, articulated the economic requirement without reference to
predicate acts as the court in Ivic had done expressly. See Ivic, 700 F.2d at 65. The court's decision
not to mimic the language of the Ivic decision indicates departure from the Ivic standard.
Second, the Eighth Circuit's economic requirement was first articulated in dicta in Anderson, a
case involving predicate acts with an economic orientation. See supra note 84. If economically
oriented predicate acts could serve as a substitute for an enterprise with an economic goal, that court
would have announced that standard. Thus, although arguments can be made supporting the claim
that the Eighth Circuit's economic test is equivalent to the Second Circuit's test, the stronger posi-
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C. No Economic Requirement
Recently, the Third Circuit rejected both the Second and Eighth Cir-
cuits' formulation of RICO's economic requirement. In Northeast Wo-
men's Center, Inc. v. McMonagle,93 the defendants, anti-abortion
demonstrators, repeatedly trespassed at an abortion clinic. 94 The defend-
ants harassed the clinic's clients and employees and damaged and disas-
sembled machinery. 95 In its civil RICO suit, the clinic accused the
defendants of violating the Hobbs Act96 by extorting the clinic's right to
operate a business and its staff's right to employment.97
The Third Circuit rejected defendants' contention that RICO does not
extend to acts of "civil disobedience." 98 In so doing, the court followed
well-established precedent and held that the predicate offense, a Hobbs
Act crime,99 did not require an economic goal."°° The court's holding
tion is that the Eighth Circuit meant exactly what it said when it stated that a RICO "enterprise
must be directed toward an economic goal." Flynn, 852 F.2d at 1052.
93. 868 F.2d 1342 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 261 (1989). Because he perceived a need to
resolve the split of authority on this issue, Justice White dissented from the Supreme Court's denial
of certiorari. Northeast Women's Center, Inc. v. McMonagle, 110 S. Ct. 261 (1981). Justice White
relied on United States v. Ivic, 700 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1983) and United States v. Flynn, 852 F.2d 1045
(8th Cir.), cert denied, 109 S. Ct. 511 (1988), to illustrate the split in authority on the economic
issue. Justice White is quite familiar with RICO having written some of the more famous RICO
decisions: Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479 (1985) and United States v. Turkette, 452
U.S. 576 (1981).
94. McMonagle, 868 F.2d at 1345.
95. Id. at 1346. On their first visit, the protestors stormed the clinic, threw medical supplies on
the floor, and prevented access to the rooms. Id. at 1345. In the process, they knocked down and
injured employees. Id. Less than one year later, the defendants returned. Id. at 1346. This time
they locked themselves in a room while they damaged and disassembled operating room machinery.
Id. The third trespass was less successful, with only two protestors making it into the clinic. During
the fourth and final trespass, the protestors chided the clinic's patients. The last three trespasses
resulted in trespass charges and conviction. Id.
96. 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1988).
97. McMonagle, 868 F.2d at 1350. The Hobbs Act makes it a crime to extort property from a
business engaged in interstate commerce. See 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) & (b)(2) (1988).
98. McMonagle, 868 F.2d at 1348. The defendants moved to introduce evidence that their
political beliefs motivated their actions. Id. Because the defendants did not show some purpose for
the evidence other than to prove absence of an economic motivation, the court rejected this evidence
as irrelevant. Id. at 1352-53.
99. See supra note 97.
100. McMonagle, 868 F.2d at 1349-50. The Second Circuit agrees with this interpretation of the
Hobbs Act. United States v. Tropiano, 418 F.2d 1069 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1021
(1970). Thus, the difference in the Second and Third Circuits' interpretations of RICO's economic
requirement does not arise from disagreement over interpretation of the Hobbs Act.
In addition, the court ensured that the prosecution did not infringe on the defendants' first amend-
ment rights. McMonagle, 868 F.2d at 1348-49. The court reviewed the jury instruction explaining
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made it unnecessary to consider the defendants' more expansive argu-
ment-that an economic requirement applies to all of RICO's predicate
offenses. 10 1
In McMonagle, the court did not decide whether proof of the eco-
nomic nature of the enterprise is required because the defendants did not
raise that issue on appeal."° However, in a similar case in the Western
District of Washington, Feminist Women's Health Center v. Roberts,103
that court rejected both the need for economically motivated activity and
for a profit-seeking enterprise. Roberts involved protests against an abor-
tion clinic similar to those in McMonagle.t° The defendants' repeated
harassment forced the Feminist Women's Health Center to close.'05 Re-
jecting the economic limitation adopted in United States v. Ivic as incon-
sistent with the Supreme Court's directives to construe RICO broadly,
the trial court denied the defendants' motion to dismiss the RICO
count. 1o6
both the demonstrators' first amendment rights as well as the clinic's rights. The district court ad-
vised the jury that an individual who exceeds her right to dissent and violates the rights of others
cannot cloak herself in first amendment protections. Id. at 1349. The court found that the district
court's instruction adequately protected the defendants' first amendment rights. Id.
101. McMonagle, 868 F.2d at 1349 n.7.
102. The court did not address the enterprise element because the demonstrators did not appeal
that jury instruction. The trial judge instructed the jury that an enterprise existed if the defendants
formed an "ongoing organization, either formal or informal in nature in which the various associates
functioned as a continuing unit." Id. at 1348 n.5. Because the clinic charged the demonstrators with
a § 1962(c) violation, the judge also instructed the jury that the enterprises goal must be distinct
from completing the predicate offenses. Id. Contrary to the Eighth Circuit's rule, the jury instruc-
tion included no mention of an economic goal.
103. No. C86-161Z (W.D. Wash. May 5, 1989) (WESTLAW).
104. Id. The antiabortion demonstrators in Roberts performed various acts of harassment.
Feminist Women's Health Center v. Roberts, No. C86-161(V)D (W.D. Wash. Mar. 11, 1988)
(WESTLAW). They made "hang up" phone calls to the Center; they occupied all the center's park-
ing with their automobiles; they created a gauntlet that patrons had to pass through to enter the
Center; one defendant went as far as to set the Center on fire three times. Id. The Center closed
after the last fire. Id.
105. Id. In addition to the Center, other plaintiffs included the Center's director and employees.
Id.
106. Feminist Women's Health Center v. Roberts, No. C86-161(V)D n.2 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 11,
1988) (WESTLAW). In a supplemental motion to strike other predicate offenses, the district court
did strike some alleged predicate offenses, rejecting plaintiff's claim that some defendants violated
the Travel Act and feloniously rendered criminal assistance. Feminist Women's Health Center v.
Roberts, No. C86-161Z (W.D. Wash. May 5, 1989). The court refused to dismiss, however, the
allegations of Hobbs Act extortion, aiding and abetting arson, and mail fraud. Id.
The defendants contended that RICO does not apply to non-economic political activities. The
district court rejected this motion, noting that it had addressed this concern in a prior Order for
Reconsideration. Feminist Women's Health Center v. Roberts, No. C86-161(V)D (W.D. Wash.
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III. ANALYSIS
A. Enterprise
RICO presents a bifurcated definition of enterprise.1 7 One clause in
the definition encompasses legitimate organizations such as partnerships
and corporations."0 8 The other embraces illegitimate organizations" 9
and applies broadly to "any . . . group of individuals associated in
fact."' 110 "Any union or group" includes informal organizations without
reference to their financial orientation."'1
Thus, the specific language of the statute does not impose an economic
goal requirement on these informal enterprises; the requirement must
arise from the general tenor of the "enterprise" definition's first clause.
This clause lists examples of legitimate organizations that may satisfy the
enterprise element.112 Of these examples at least two typically operate to
make money: corporations and partnerships.11 3  Thus, a noneconomi-
cally motivated defendant might assert that RICO includes an economic
requirement by invoking the ejusdem generis rule of statutory construc-
Mar. 11, 1988) (WESTLAW). In that Order, the court rejected the defendants' assertion that RICO
requires an economic motivation. Id. n.2. The court reaffirmed its prior decision, adding that a non-
profit organization can constitute a RICO enterprise because of the Supreme Court's directives to
construe RICO broadly. Feminist Women's Health Center v. Roberts, No. C86-161Z (W.D. Wash.
May 3, 1989) (WESTLAW) (citing Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479 (1985)).
107. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (1988). See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
108. United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 581 (1981). In Turkette, the Supreme Court ad-
dressed the First Circuit's interpretation of "enterprise." Id. at 578. The First Circuit stood alone in
its opinion that the enterprise definition was not limited to criminal organizations. Id. In its nearly
unanimous decision (Justice Stewart dissented), the Court provided the first thorough analysis of the
"enterprise" definition. The Court concluded that regardless of the legitimacy of the organization,
an enterprise is simply "a group of persons associated together for a common purpose of engaging in
a course of conduct." Id. at 583. The Court distinguished this group as an entity separate and apart
from the pattern of racketeering in which it engaged. Id.
109. Id. at 580-81. The term "illegitimate" encompasses all entities that do not have a legal
charter whether or not they exist for purely criminal objectives. After Turkette, "enterprise" indis-
putably includes all nonlegal entities whether or not they exist for exclusively criminal objectives.
Id. at 578.
110. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (1988). See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
111. 'There is no restriction upon the associations embraced by the definition: an enterprise
includes any union or group of individuals associated in fact." Turkette, 452 U.S. at 580.
112. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
113. Although nonprofit corporations and partnerships do not operate to make a profit, they
require financial income. Just as the defendants in United States v. Bagaric, 706 F.2d 42 (2d Cir.),
cerL denied sub nom Logarusic v. United States, 464 U.S. 840 (1983), needed funds to achieve
Croatian independence, a nonprofit organization needs money to achieve its charitable goals. As the
Second Circuit stated in Bagaric, the defendants must act at least in part to fulfill an economic goal,
but the defendants' economic goal need not form their primary motivation. Id. at 58.
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tion. The rule states that when "general words follow a specific enumer-
ation of persons or things, the general words should be limited to persons
or things similar to those specifically enumerated."'1 14 The defendant
would argue that because the associations listed in the first clause of the
definition of "enterprise" have a financial orientation, Congress intended
that those listed in the second clause also have an economic
motivation.115
The Supreme Court, however, rejected a similar argument in United
States v. Turkette.116 In Turkette, the defendant claimed that the rule of
ejusdem generis required the Court to conclude that RICO extends only
to legitimate organizations. 17 The defendant reasoned that because the
first clause refers to legitimate organizations, the second clause, which
the defendant claimed was a general statement of the first clause, was
equally confined to legitimate organizations.118 Rejecting the defendant's
argument, the Court stated that the two clauses in the enterprise defini-
tion are independent. 9 The Court held that the second clause refers
exclusively to illegitimate organizations and the first clause to legitimate
organizations. 2 Although Turkette involved the relationship of the two
clauses in the context of the legitimacy of an organization, the Court's
holding implies that the financially oriented examples in the first clause
do not similarly limit the broad language, "any union or group of indi-
viduals," in the second clause.
If Congress intended to limit the application of RICO to enterprises
with an economic motivation, it knew how to do so explicitly. 21 Con-
114. United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 581 (1981).
115. However, the first clause also includes "individual[s]," "association[s]," and "other legal
entit[ies]." 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (1988). The fact that it is less clear that these entities have an
economic motivation weakens the ejusdem generis argument.
116. 452 U.S. 576, 581 (1981).
117. Id. at 581.
118. Id. at 581-82.
119. Id. at 582. The Court found two flaws in the defendant's assertion. First, courts apply
rules of statutory construction only to ambiguous or unclear language. The Court held that the
language at issue here was clear. Id. at 581. Second, this tool of statutory interpretation applies only
when general words follow specific words. The Court held that the second clause in the enterprise
dflinition was not a generalization of the first clause, but a different and independent category. Id. at
582.
120. Id.
121. See United States v. Turkette, 456 U.S. 576 (1981). The dispute in Turkette centered
around the definition of enterprise. The Court stated that Congress would have inserted the word
"legitimate" if it intended to limit RICO enterprises to legitimate organizations. Id. at 581. The
language of the statute best exemplifies congressional intent. Id. at 593. Because the statute does not
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gress demonstrated this in other substantive provisions of the Organized
Crime Control (OCC) Act. 122  In the sections regulating explosives, 123
Congress used the term "business" when defining the covered entities.124
Congress also limited application of the OCC's syndicated gambling sec-
tion 125 to "illegal gambling business[es]"1 26 and defined an illegal gam-
bling business as one which operates for more than thirty days or grosses
over $2000 a day.1 27 These definitions illustrate Congress' ability to limit
entities to those operating for economic profit. Congress imposed no
similar limits in the definition of enterprise.128
. Racketeering Acts
Increased difficulty arises when courts require proof that a defendant's
racketeering acts have an economic motivation. "Racketeering activity"
is defined in terms of performing at least two of the predicate acts listed
in the statute. 129 Thus, the requisite mens rea and actus reus derive from
the statutes codifying these predicate acts.13 Such crimes as murder,131
indicate congressional intent to exclude exclusively criminal organizations, the Court refrained from
interpreting the statute to include such a limitation. Id.
122. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 (OCC), tit. IX, Pub. L. No. 91.452, 84 Stat. 922, as
amended by Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, tit. II, Pub. L. No. 98473, § 302, 98 Stat.
2040 (1970) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1988)). The OCC has three substan-
tive titles: title VIII covers illegal gambling; title IX is RICO; and title XI regulates explosives.
123. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, tit. XI, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 68 Stat. 170, 74 Stat. 87
(codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 841-848 (1988)).
124. Section 842 makes it illegal for individuals to operate a "business of importing, manufactur-
ing or dealing in explosive materials without a license." 18 U.S.C. § 842(a)(1) (1988). The statute
also limits "importers," "manufacturers," and "dealers" to individuals engaged in that "business."
18 U.S.C. §§ 841(g), (h), (i) (1988).
125. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, tit. VIII, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 62 Stat. 769, 81 Stat.
362 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1501-1510 (1988)).
126. 18 U.S.C. § 1955(a) (1988).
127. 18 U.S.C. § 1955(b)(1)(iii) (1988).
128. Congress not only steered away from the term "business" but it used broad terms. See 18
U.S.C. § 1961(4) (1988); supra note 28 and accompanying text.
129. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1), (5) (1988).
130. In Northeast Women's Center, Inc. v. McMonagle, 868 F.2d 1342 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
110 S. Ct. 261 (1989), for example, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants violated the Hobbs Act.
The defendants claimed that their acts must have an economic goal to constitute RICO predicAte
offenses. The court rejected this argument and looked solely to the Hobbs Act to find the necessary
intent and injury. Id. at 1348-50.
131. The elements of murder vary from state to state but never include an economic require-
ment. For example, the Model Penal Code defines murder as causing the death of another either
purposely or knowingly or with reckless indifference for the value of human life. MODEL PENAL
CODE §§ 210.2, 210.1 (1985).
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obstruction of justice, 132 obstruction of criminal investigation, 13 and ob-
struction of state and local law enforcement 13  do not explicitly require
an economic motive. These crimes are frequently committed for reasons
other than financial gain. Even mail fraud, 135 one of the most commonly
alleged predicate acts, does not require the perpetrator to have an eco-
nomic goal. 136  Moreover, because the statute incorporates the clause
"racketeering activity" into the definition of pattern without embellish-
132. 18 U.S.C. § 1505 criminalizes:
corruptly ... threatening... to influence, intimidate, or impede any grand or petit juror,
or officer in or of any court of the United States, or officer who may be serving at any
examination or other proceeding before any United States Commissioner or other commit-
ting magistrate, in the discharge of his duty, or injures any such grand or petit juror in his
person or property on account of any verdict or indictment assented to by him, or on
account of his being or having been such juror, or injures any such officer, commissioner,
or other committing magistrate in his person or property on account of the performance of
his official duties, or corruptly or by threats of force, or by any threatening letter or com-
munication, influences, obstructs, or impedes, or endeavors to influence, obstruct, or im-
pede, the due administration of justice.
18 U.S.C. § 1505 (1988).
The penalty for violating this statute is a fine not to exceed $5,000 or imprisonment for not more
than five years, or both. 18 U.S.C. § 1505 (1988). See also supra note 43.
133. 18 U.S.C. § 1510(a) provides that:
Whoever willfully endeavors by means of bribery to obstruct, delay, or prevent the commu-
nication of information relating to a violation of any criminal statute of the United States
by any person to a criminal investigator shall be fined not more than $5,000, or imprisoned
not more than five years, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 1510(a) (1988). See also supra note 43.
134. 18 U.S.C. § 1511 (1988). That section provides in part: "[ilt shall be unlawful for two or
more persons to conspire to obstruct the enforcement of the criminal laws of a State or political
subdivision thereof, with the intent to facilitate an illegal gambling business." 18 U.S.C. § 1511(a)
(1988).
135. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 provides:
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for
obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or
promises, . . . for the purpose of executing such scheme or artifice or attempting to do so,
places in any post office or authorized depository for mail matter, any matter or thing
whatever to be sent or delivered by the Postal Service, or takes or receives therefrom, any
such matter or thing, or knowingly causes to be delivered by mail according to the direc-
tion thereon, or at the place at which it is directed to be delivered by the person to whom it
is addressed, any such matter or thing, shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned
not more than five years, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1988). See also supra note 43. The breadth of this statute's application to "any
matter" mailed or "knowingly cause[d]" to be mailed leads plaintiffs to use this statute frequently.
See infra note 136 for a discussion of the broad meaning of property.
136. For decades, the circuit courts construed the mail fraud statute as protecting against the
defrauding of intangible rights. But in 1987, the Supreme Court limited the statute to the defrauding
of money or property. McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 360 (1987). The Court subsequently
extended the definition of property to include confidential business information without regard for its
intrinsic value. Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 28 (1987). Thus, under the Supreme
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ment, the statute's plain language does not require an economic motiva-
tion for the predicate acts to form a pattern. 137
C. Legislative intent
In devising RICO, Congress intended to eliminate the powerful eco-
nomic base of organized crime. 138  Congress was concerned with the
power created by vast amounts of illegal wealth, 139 and the concomitant
devastating effects of organized crime on legitimate businesses and the
national economy. 140
The economic power Congress feared does not exist in the case of a
noneconomically motivated defendant. While this conclusion suggests
that RICO does not reach such defendants, it is only one step in the
analysis. The defendant's motivation does not alter the impact on the
Court's construction of the mail fraud statute, a defendant could violate the mail fraud statute with-
out an economic goal as defined by the Second and Eighth Circuits.
Congress intended an even broader construction of the mail fraud statute. In response to Mc-
Nally, Congress enacted 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (1988). With this enactment, the mail fraud statute once
again covered schemes to defraud another of the "intangible right of honest services." 18 U.S.C.
§ 1346 (1988). Thus, acts occurring before or after the enactment of § 1346 can constitute mail
fraud even if the acts lacked an economic goal.
137. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
138. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
139. See also,
115 CONG. REc. 827 (1969) (remarks of Sen. McClellan) ("Organized crime... uses its ill-
gotten gains. . . to infiltrate and secure control of legitimate business and labor union
activities"); 116 CONG. REC. 591 (1970) (remarks of Sen. McClellan) ("[llegally gained
revenue also makes it possible for organized crime to infiltrate and pollute legitimate busi-
ness"); id. at 603 (remarks of Sen. Yarborough) ("[RICO] is designed to root out the influ-
ence of organized crime in legitimate business, into which billions of dollars of illegally
obtained money is channeled"); Id. at 606 (remarks of Sen. Byrd) ("loan sharking paves
the way for organized criminals to gain access to and eventually take over the control of
thousands of legitimate businesses"); id. at 35193 (remarks of Rep. Pon) ("[Tlitle IX...
will deal not only with individuals, but also with the economic base through which those
individuals constitute such a serious threat to the economic well-being of the Nation. In
short, an attack must be made on their source of economic power itself.. ."); S. Rep. No.
91-617, supra, at 76-78; H. R. Rep. No. 1574, supra, at 5 ("The President's Crime Commis-
sion found that the greatest menace that organized crime presents is its ability through the
accumulation of illegal gains to infiltrate into legitimate business and labor unions");
Hearings on Organized Crime Control before Subcommittee No. 5 of the House Committee
on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., 170 (1970) (Department of Justice Comments) ("Ti-
tle IX is designed to inhibit the infiltration of legitimate business by organized crime, and,
like the previous title, to reach the criminal syndicates' major sources of revenue.") (empha-
sis supplied).
cited in United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 592 n.14 (1981).
140. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 1970 U.S. CODE CONo. &
AVnib . NEWS (84 Stat. 922) 1073.
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victimized organization, another congressional concern. 141 In Northeast
Women's Center, Inc. v. McMonagle, 42 for example, the defendants' ac-
tivities had a devastating effect on the center's business even though the
defendants were zealous political activists rather than members of organ-
ized crime.' 43 Congress expressed as much concern for the injury to the
organization as for the financial benefits to the perpetrator of the acts.'"
Therefore, Congress clearly did not intend to limit RICO to claims that
manifest only one of Congress' concerns, an economically injured plain-
tiff, but not the other, an economically powerful defendant.
D. Policy considerations
A judicially created financial goal requirement is a poor means of lim-
iting the scope of RICO for several reasons. First, careful pleading can
convert a noneconomically motivated enterprise into an economically
motivated enterprise. For example, in Northeast Women's Center, Inc. v.
McMonagle,145 the plaintiffs alleged that the individuals who planned to
destroy the clinic comprised the enterprise. The Pro-Life Coalition of
Southeastern Pennsylvania (Coalition), however, orchestrated the anti-
abortion demonstrators' activities. The Coalition raised at least $120,000
a year and paid the named defendant, McMonagle, an annual salary of
$32,000 a year as director of the Coalition.'" A plaintiff alleging that
the Coalition has a financial existence apart from the demonstrations 47
and that the proper nexus existed between McMonagle's acts and the
Coalition to characterize the Coalition as the enterprise, 14 could satisfy
both the Second and Eighth Circuits' economic requirement. 49
141. See supra note 10.
142. 868 F.2d 1342 (3d Cir.), cerL denied, 110 S. Ct. 261 (1989) (anti -abortion protestors force
closing of Women's Health Center).
143. Because of the defendants' activities, the Center hired security guards, lost its lease, and
installed a security system at its new location. Some employees, fearing for their safety, resigned.
Id. at 1345-47. These activities limited the Center's "freedom of choice," just as organized crime
limits legitimate business' freedom of choice. See also supra note 104 and accompanying text.
144. See supra note 10.
145. 624 F. Supp. 736, 738 (E.D. Pa. 1985).
146. Northeast Women's Center, Inc. v. McMonagle, 868 F.2d 1342, 1349 n.7 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 110 S. Ct. 261 (1989).
147. See supra note 84.
148. See Hunt v. Weatherbee, 626 F. Supp. 1097, 1102 (D. Mass. 1986); infra note 155 and
accompanying text.
149. An economically motivated enterprise satisfies both the Second and Eighth Circuit tests.
See supra notes 52-92 and accompanying text.
In Northeast Women's Center, Inc. v. McMonagle, 868 F.2d 1342, 1349 n.7 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
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Second, when courts use the defendant's economic motivation as a
yardstick for applying RICO, fortuity may determine the availability of a
RICO claim. In Hunt v. Weatherbee,150 the plaintiff' 5' brought a RICO
claim against union officers' 52 alleging that the defendants on two occa-
sions directed sexually discriminatory animus at her.'5 3 The court de-
nied defendants' motion to dismiss the RICO counts. 5 4 The major issue
in the decision was whether an agency relationship existed between the
steward, who committed one of the alleged predicate acts, and the union
officers. If the plaintiff could establish the agency relationship, the RICO
claim would allege the requisite two predicate acts and the union would
form the RICO enterprise.155
Because a union has an economic existence apart from the discrimina-
110 S. Ct. 261 (1989), the Center offered evidence that the anti-abortion coalition raised S120,000 a
year to prove the defendants' economic purpose. The court did not decide the sufficiency of the
evidence on this issue because it rejected the defendants' economic defense. Id.
150. 626 F. Supp. 1097 (D. Mass. 1986).
151. Id. at 1099. The plaintiff, Ms. Hunt, completed a four year apprentice program to become a
certified journeyman carpenter. Id. The United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners of America,
Local 40 (Local 40) contracted to locate employment for Ms. Hunt. The alleged predicate offenses
occurred as Ms. Hunt performed the jobs Local 40 provided. Id.
152. Id. In all, Ms. Hunt sued five defendants. Three were Local 40 officers: a shop steward, the
Local 40 business agent, and the financial secretary/assistant business agent. Id. The other two
were a contractor and its general superintendent. Id.
153. Id. at 1099. While at work, a "fellow servant" assaulted plaintiff and she filed a criminal
complaint. Id. Union officers called plaintiff to a meeting where they coerced her into withdrawing
the complaint. Id. Two of the defendants, weatherbee and Bryant, were present at this meeting.
The meeting was the first instance of sexually discriminatory animus. The second occurred when a
third union defendant addressed "hostile and intimidating" statements at plaintiff in an attempt to
persuade her to buy Local 40 Political Action Fund raffle tickets. Id. Plaintiff left for fear of her
safety. Id. She reported the incident to Weatherbee, who refused to act. Id.
154. Id. at 1098. The defendants based their motion on three grounds. First, the defendants
contended that plaintiff's claim constituted a request for recovery of emotional distress. Id. at 1100.
Second, they asserted that plaintiff needed to allege a nexus with organized crime. Id. Third, they
argued that plaintiff had not alleged activity constituting a RICO pattern. Id. at 1101. The court
rejected all three grounds. Id. at 1100-04.
155. Id. at 1102-03. Weatherbee, a union officer, appointed the shop steward, Shaw, to the posi-
tion of soliciting fund agent. The other union officer-defendant's responsibilities included fund col-
lection. Id. at 1103. In addition, plaintiff requested assistance from Weatherbee. Id. The court held
that if plaintiff proved these allegations at trial, they would suffice to establish the necessary agency
relationship. Id.
The court held that if the shop steward acted within the scope of his authority as the union
officers' agent then the court might find the officers indictable under the Hobbs Act. Id. The defend-
ants' positions in the union afforded them the opportunity to commit the predicate offenses and the
enterprise need not prosper from the activities. Id. at 1102. Thus, the union could form the RICO
enterprise. Id.
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tory acts of its agents,156 plaintiff's claim would stand even in the Second
and Eighth Circuits.157 If, however, by a fortuitous change in facts the
plaintiff could not establish that the enterprise has a separate economic
motivation, the Second and Eighth Circuits would dismiss the claim be-
cause neither the acts of sexual harassment nor the enterprise has an
economic goal.158
Suppose, for example, the plaintiff belonged to the Sierra Club rather
than a union, and, doubting her commitment to the environment, zealous
members drove her to resign from her job.15 9 Although the impact on
the plaintiff in each case is identical, the Second and Eighth Circuits
would not allow her claim because neither the Sierra Club nor its mem-
bers were motivated by money. Such fortuities should not determine the
viability of a plaintiff's RICO claim.
Finally, under the Second and Eighth Circuits' tests, courts face the
onerous task of determining what constitutes an economic goal. The
Second Circuit requires objective manifestation of the defendant's
goal." 6  Application of this test is not simple. In United States v. Ivic, 16 1
the defendants attempted to murder their Croatian political oppo-
nents. 1 62 In United States v. Bagaric,63 the defendants, although politi-
cally motivated, extorted money. 1" The former case does not implicate
an economic consideration, 16 5 whereas the latter clearly does.1 66 Not all
cases, however, are so straightforward. A borderline case exists when
156. See United States v. Flynn, 852 F.2d 1045, 1052 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 974
(1988). In Flynn, the defendants sought to control a labor union. Id. at 1047-50. The court held
that the defendants' "goal served to promote an economic purpose." Id.
157. See supra notes 52-92 and accompanying text.
158. One act of coercion involved raffle ticket sales. This act might constitute an economic goal.
Hunt, 626 F. Supp. at 1107. Obstructing a criminal investigation, a noneconomically motivated
offense, formed the second predicate act. Id. The two alleged predicate offenses could have easily
arisen, however, from similar noneconomically motivated offenses because the union officers' acts
demonstrated a pattern of sexually discriminatory animus. Id. The union officials acted primarily
out of sexual animosity and not to profit financially. Id. at 1104.
159. This example is purely hypothetical. The Sierra Club merely serves as an example of a
nonprofit organization with a clearly non-economic agenda.
160. United States v. Bagaric, 706 F.2d 42, 53 n.II (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Logarusic v.
United States, 464 U.S. 840 (1983).
161. 700 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1983).
162. See supra notes 53-55 and accompanying text.
163. 706 F.2d 42 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nora. Logarusic v. United States, 464 U.S. 840
(1983).
164. See supra notes 73-75 and accompanying text.
165. See supra notes 52-70 and accompanying text.
166. See supra notes 72-83 and accompanying text.
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robbery or extortion nets the defendants goods rather than cash. For
example, when demonstrators remove an essential but inexpensive piece
of medical equipment from an abortion clinic, the small value of the sto-
len good did not motivate the act or benefit the thieves financially.16 7 Yet
a financial goal does exist when the same individuals break into a jewelry
store and remove valuable gold necklaces. The spectrum of possibilities
between these two examples contains a myriad of situations in which the
court will find it difficult to ascertain whether a financial goal exists.
Resolution of such cases may require courts to investigate into the de-
fendant's subjective motivation, an approach even the Second Circuit
rejected.1 68
V. CONCLUSION
Courts should not require proof of the defendant's economic orienta-
tion as a prerequisitive to a RICO claim.1 69 The statutory language does
not support this requirement either explicitly or implicitly.170 Moreover,
an economic requirement fails as a tool to distinguish those claims that
RICO should cover from those Congress clearly did not intend RICO to
cover. To limit RICO in a meaningfud way will require more than a
patchwork of judicial modifications. It is up to Congress to review the
167. This occurred in Northeast Women's Center, Inc. v. MeMonagle, 868 F.2d 1342 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 261 (1989). Justice White characterized the demonstrators' actions in that
case as not economically motivated. Northeast Women's Center, Inc. v. McMonagle, 110 S. Ct. 261
(1989) (dissenting from denial of cettiorari).
168. United States v. Bagaric, 706 F.2d 42, 54 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Logarusic v.
United States, 464 U.S. 840 (1983).
169. Some authorities feel there is no need to limit RICO because civil plaintiffs have not abused
it or, alternatively, have not succeeded in abusing it. See Goldsmith & Keith, Civil RICO Abuse: The
Allegations in Context, 1986 B.Y.U.L. REV. 55; Goldsmith & Maynes, The Undermining of Civil
RICO, CraM. JusT., Spring 1987, at 6 (relatively few plaintiffs' judgments in civil cases because most
are dismissed at pleadings stage); Jost, The Fraudulent Case Against RICO, CALIF. LAW., May
1989, at 48; Spahn, Introduction to Civil RICO, VA. B. AssN. J., Summer 1987, at 8 (weak cases may
offend judge and cause adverse ruling on other matters.)
170. Goldsmith & Maynes, The Undermining of Civil RICO, CRiM. JuST., Spring 1987, at 6
(Department of Justice opposed to proposed modifications although agrees on limiting RICO). The
Supreme Court described RICO as a carefully crafted piece of legislation in lannelli v. United States,
420 U.S. 770, 789 (1975). More recently, however, the Supreme Court has indicated that Congress
may have done a poor job in drafting RICO, but it is still up to Congress and not the courts to
rewrite it. H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 109 S. Ct. 2893, 2905 (1989).
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statute in its entirety and craft appropriate amendments to serve the stat-
ute's purposes.
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